đ·Photo by Hello Iâm Nik on Unsplash
đ·Photo by Hello Iâm Nik on Unsplash
Originally published on Forbes in multiple parts. Part 1 here.
Youâre more likely hear about the companies that venture capitalists said âyesâ toâââthe big funding rounds, the success stories, and the unicorns. But the day-to-day reality of being a VC is that we spend ~99% of our time saying âno.â Itâs a core competency of any VC. Or at least it should be.
Most of the time VCs have one or more discrete reasons for saying âno.â Although it would be ideal if we relayed them to founders clearly and openly, we sometimes feel pressure to take the less confrontational path and say vague things âthis is too early for usâ when the truth is more difficult to hear. VCs have a code around rejection language that often leaves founders scratching their heads to interpret, but candor is usually better for both parties long-term. Truthfully, the reason for the ânoâ often has little to do with the founder or the details of the business, but lots to do with that VCâs personal interests, portfolio, or history.
Below Iâve listed the most common ânoâsâ Iâve seen. I describe them through the lens of early-stage technology venture because thatâs what I do. âEarly stageâ for this purpose means pre-seed, seed, and Series A. If youâre a founder and youâve gotten one of these reasons, my aim is to expand on what motivations or thoughts may underlie each. And if youâve heard one that Iâve missed, Iâm curious to know.
Thereâs one caveat to almost all of these reasons for passing, though: VCs will make exceptions to every one of them when we think the founders are absolutely incredible. This bar is extremely high and is based on our personal experience with them, their track record, or both.
Market-related reasons
đ·âaerial photography of village during nighttimeâ by Geoff Greenwood on Unsplash
đ·âaerial photography of village during nighttimeâ by Geoff Greenwood on Unsplash
âThe opportunityâs not big enoughâ
VCs want to invest in companies that can grow to become massive. We strive for 10x, 100x, even 1000x returns. Youâre building something that might be a great, sustainable business, but we donât see it being venture-scale. E.g., you make software for US-based entertainment lawyers who focus on celebrity endorsements, and youâre charging a SaaS subscription of $100/month. There might be a thousand of those lawyers in the US, and even if you got all of them to sign up and had zero marketing and 100% margins (which you wonât), youâre making $1.2M per year. Thatâs too small for venture capital.
âYouâre too early to marketâ
The investor may like your idea but thinks itâll take significant time for the market to come around and recognize its value. Funding the company now means that itâll take a few checks to keep it alive until the world realizes it needs to pay for the product or wants to use it. Imagine fundraising for a mobile gaming startup in 2004 when the iPhone didnât launch until 2007: even if the founders are visionary and know that mobile gaming will be big, how will they cover expenses for the 3+ years itâll take for that to happen?
âNo (or weak) competitive differentiatorâ
Someone else could come along and build this exact thing easily. Even if youâre the first to market, competition could cut down your position and your ability to command a high price whenever they choose to. We often say this about startups that donât have a strong technical element to them. The less technical an idea is, the simpler it is to copy. Having a unique brand may feel like a competitive differentiatorâââand some of the most successful companies have built themselves up on brandâââbut a bad PR scandal or well-executed knockoffs can derail that fast.
âUnfavorable macroeconomic or regulatory trendsâ
It feels like the wrong time to start this business, whether because of shifts in technology, behavior, or regulation. For example, Apple announcing they were dropping the headphone jack was bad news for companies making non-Bluetooth headphones, whereas Apple switching to USB-C charging cables was great for companies who had already embraced that standard. A regulation that bans facial recognition scanning in retail stores would be tough on a company selling those systems to malls.
âAn existing, more established company could do it easilyâ
Big companies with tons of product lines, employees, and resources can quickly release products that encompass a startupâs entire concept. Building something that falls in the realm of one of these companiesâ roadmapsâââthink Amazon, Google, and Facebookâââcan instill fear in VCs. Sure, it makes you a potential acquisition target, but most investors want you to aim to create a large, sustainable, standalone business first. Theyâre more valuable. For example, if I meet a startup that creates animated avatars for augmented reality, Iâm wondering whether Snap is going to roll out the same capability next week.
âThis is a crowded spaceâ
The VC thinks there are too many competitors already working on this problem. Break it down further, though, and it could suggest a few nuances. Maybe the investor is worried about your sales and marketing abilities to stand out from the crowd. Maybe they think youâre not the one to bet on in this group. In any case, competition is fierce and the thought of having to battle for visibility, users, ad space, and market share is making the investor wary. Instead of joining a competitive space, VCs would rather you start a new industry from scratch or heavily disrupt an existing one.
Founder/team-related
âFounder or team dynamicsâ
This reason can be uncomfortable to explain to a founder, but itâs a frequent one for VCs. These negative dynamics can take many forms, but at their core, they signal that the team either isnât meshing well today or wonât in the future. Examples include:
A dominant founder who belittles and speaks over the others, who appear frustrated
Too many co-founders (usually more than three), whose job titles and expertise appear to intrude on each othersâ; e.g., a COO, CEO, CSO, and CFO is far too many non-technical founding members at an early stage startup
Having both a CEO and a President, which suggests that there are two egos and neither wants to look âlesserâ than the other
A married or dating founding team (not always a red flag, but many VCs consider it to be one)
Multiple co-founders from academia who arenât involved in the business day-to-day
A very seasoned founding team from big corporations or consultancies that doesnât have any startup experience
Any other palpable tension, awkwardness, or discomfort between the founders that seems abnormal
âMissing a key personâ
This is a chicken-and-egg problem: founders raise money to hire great people for their teams, but having great people on their teams is what enables them to fundraise, especially at the very early stages when they donât have much product or traction. Sometimes we see a founding team thatâs missing a skillset thatâs so key to that business that we have to pass. E.g., you have an autonomous vehicle startup with a business model that requires you to integrate your system with car manufacturers, and your team is all technical and doesnât have any business development ability. Not having a business-focused founder, especially one whoâs worked with auto OEMs, is problematic.
âFounders arenât mission-drivenâ
This is another way of saying that the founders just donât seem that into the idea. They should care deeply about the problem theyâre building the company to solve, and ideally have experienced it themselves. They may reference the draw of making money, which is never the right reason to found a company; not even an absurdly high salary will keep people fighting during the inevitable dark periods that startups have to face. Or they refer to doing something else in a few years and donât see this company as long-term. E.g., the past few months VCs have been seeing a lot of âblockchain for Xâ pitches where the founders donât seem to have a great reason for including blockchain, other than other peopleâs hype.
âLack of focusâ
The VC thinks youâre trying to do too many things at once. This could apply to several spots in the business, including product (youâre trying to build too many things), go-to-market (youâre trying to sell to an array of customers without understanding which oneâs truly best), business model (e.g., you have freemium, paid with multiple pricing tiers, and enterprise sales, but you havenât sold anything yet), team (multiple part-time people who should be full time, including founders who havenât quit their day jobs yet) or operations (e.g., you have a time-consuming services studio in addition to the startup business).
âPersonality/behavioral red flagsâ
This is another one that VCs may not tell you directly unless you press them on the reason why they passed. Itâs uncomfortable. But there are cases when a founder comes in and displays sexist, racist, rude, or otherwise negative behavior that makes us write off backing that person. Things Iâve seen: men only engaging with male investors and not with female investors present in the same meeting (that includes speaking, hand-shaking, and eye contact); people who are obnoxious to office support staff or waiters; narcissistic people taking 45 minutes of an hour-long meeting rambling about their bios; and spouting off sexist or racist opinions. VCs are gauging whether youâre the right person to lead a team and provide those people with a safe workplace thatâll act as a second home. We donât want to entrust that to youâââat least not with our capitalâââif youâre an asshole.
âDishonestyâ
An investment means a relationship that spans years, even decades. Honest, open communication is critical. If VCs think that founders are lying to us, weâre out. Thereâs intellectual dishonesty, where founders arenât honest with themselves or investors about how things are going; they will minimize problems and play up successes, making it difficult for investors to help them and shocking when the true status of the company becomes clear. Then thereâs run-of-the-mill dishonesty where founders lie outright about facts. Examples Iâve seen include inflated metrics (âweâre growing 50% month over monthâ when theyâre not), manufactured advisors (saying that high-profile Silicon Valley CEOs are advisors when they arenât), and exaggeration of product readiness (claiming that a platform is fully automated artificial intelligence when itâs really just humans on the backend).
âDistributed teamâ
Most VCs view a distributed founding team where people donât work out of the same physical location as a negative. It can work, but typically only after the company started in one place and then expanded to multiple offices as it grew. Exceptions include crypto investments where a decentralized platform and business model lend themselves to a decentralized team, and very early companies who outsource their development teams to countries with cheaper workers.
âNegative referencesâ
Someone the VC trusts had something bad to say about one or more of the founders or a key person on the team. VCs donât stick to the list of references you provide; weâll also look through LinkedIn and talk to people youâve worked with but didnât mention to us. There isnât much you can do in this situation because the VC most likely wonât divulge the person who made the comment. Be thoughtful about the LinkedIn connections you have and delete or donât accept those with people who you donât truly know well.
âCEO or founder isnât compellingâ
The founder who will assume the most public-facing role should strike an investor as exceptional and special. There has to be something about them that is moving, a je ne sais quoi that compels people to listen and to care. This same presence will be what allows them to raise money, convince employees to work for them when they have lots of other options, sell customers, build partnerships, give great press interviews, and more. There is not one right way to come off as special; the extroverted salesperson CEO often comes to mind, but the introverted technical genius who breaks down complicated architecture into simple quips fills that role too. âIâm just not that into youâ is perhaps the most difficult-to-articulate reason to pass on a startup, but one of the most common.
Individual investor or firm-related
đ·âman standing beside monument under polar lightsâ by Sweet Ice Cream Photography on Unsplash
đ·âman standing beside monument under polar lightsâ by Sweet Ice Cream Photography on Unsplash
âNot in our geographic areaâ
Most VCs have geographies in which they do and donât invest. Pay attention to the VCâs current portfolio: where are those companies located? Where are they relative to the investorâs offices? Most firms will put their preferred geographies on their websites or social media accounts. Donât waste your time pitching your UK-based company to a US firm that only invests in the US and Canada.
âItâs just not something I can get excited aboutâ
VCs are people with individual tastes and interests. Not every startup idea thrills every VC. And thatâs okayâââas a founder, your best investor match is with someone who really loves and understands what youâre trying to do. Sometimes VCs do take pitch meetings with companies that donât interest us on paper, but weâre hoping the founderâs enthusiasm will be contagious. That can happen, but itâs more likely that a VC whoâs already excited about a certain industry will get it, as opposed to converting one into a believer who isnât.
âToo capital-intensive for usâ
In non-VC jargon, this means that we think itâs going to take a ton of money to get this business to work. Different firms have different comfort thresholds with capital-intensive startups; bigger funds are often better suited for them. If youâre starting a virtual reality headset companyâââa complicated hardware playâââdonât expect a $50M pre-seed fund to be a great match. Certain industries, like cybersecurity and hardware, tend to need more funding to reach product-market fit than others, like consumer mobile apps or SaaS platforms. Theyâll need a VC who understands that itâll take a few checks (and years) to get it off the ground.
âToo early for usâ / âtoo lateâ
All VCs have a stage or range in which they invest. That stage considers how far along the product is, who and how many people are on the team, how much funding theyâve raised, what amount theyâre seeking to raise and at what valuation, their industry, and more. If a firm mainly invests in Seed and Series A companies, one thatâs just at the idea stage with nothing built and thatâs seeking $50k in funding is too early. One that has 200 people and is seeking a $50M Series C round is too late. Not aligning within a VCâs investment stage(s) is one of the most common reasons for a pass. Some VCs make personal angel investments in companies that are too early for their firm but that they love and want to stay close to as they grow.
âToo small a roundâ / âtoo big a roundâ
Like with company stage, VCs have round sizes in which they prefer to participate. Many VCs are conscious of ownership and seek to buy a certain percentage of a company when they invest. For example, Accomplice looks to put in $1M-$2.5M first checks for between 10 and 20% of a company. If a founder is raising a $15M round, our investment wonât make up a significant enough piece of it to hit our desired ownership. But as with stage (too early or too late), VCs will sometimes make exceptions to their model to have a small ownership percentage of a company that they think has huge potential.
âI couldnât convince my partnershipâ
The individual investor youâve been working with loves you and the idea, but either one of their influential partners or the partnership as a whole vetoed it. If youâve been talking to an associate who canât write a check without a senior partnerâs approval, itâs probably the senior partner that they work most closely with whoâs saying âno.â If youâve been talking to a senior partner, itâs probably that personâs equal at the firm (like one general partner talking to another). Another possibility is that the VCs are knowingly using each other as scapegoats to avoid giving a real reason for passing and preserve standing with you (âitâs not me; itâs that other personâ). One of the benefits of a partnership is absorbing the fall for each other in situations like these.
âIâve seen a similar company try this and failâ
VCs have scar tissue from the companies weâve backed that havenât worked out. Even indirect knowledge of a startupâs failure can dissuade a VC from investing in a similar company. This pass reason is more about the VCâs personal baggage than the founder to whom theyâre saying it.
âUnreasonable expectations around the VCâs roleâ
Some founders (wrongly) expect VCs to help the company where itâs weak, but far beyond whatâs normal or useful for an investor. Iâve seen founders who have a company with a very minor tech component built to date ask tech VCs to join âso you can help us build the software.â That is not our job. If you want a tech VC to back you, the tech should exist or come from you in the future. Weâll help where we can, but you shouldnât want us involved in the minutiae of the business because itâs not the best use of our time for either of us. Of course, good VCs help with a wide range of things across a companyâs lifecycle: recruiting, product testing, conflict resolution, marketing launches, strategic vision, equity and compensation, etc. But we arenât employees, and we arenât your crutch for essential parts of the company that need to come from you.
âCompetitive with a portfolio companyâ
If youâre a founder in a certain industry, itâs smart to pitch VCs who have already made investments in that industry as long as itâs broadly defined. If you get too specific with the similarities, though, you risk the VC telling you that your company is competitive with one of their existing investments. E.g., if Iâm on the board of Niantic, which made Pokemon Go, I would pass if you pitched me a new companyâs idea for âPokemon Go but for kittensâ (even though someone should make that). But a mobile gaming company in general may be a good fit.
Fundraising-related
đ·âUntil debt tear us apart printed red brick wall at daytimeâ by Alice Pasqual on Unsplash
đ·âUntil debt tear us apart printed red brick wall at daytimeâ by Alice Pasqual on Unsplash
âProblematic cap tableâ
VCs will ask to see your cap table, especially as they get more serious about the investment. Short for âcapitalization table,â itâs a spreadsheet showing which people and firms have ownership in the company and its financing rounds. Problematic cap tables may have format issues (like being out of date, not reflecting recent funding rounds or equity grants, broken models, or mispriced option grants), ownership issues (like angels who got way too much of the company for a small amount of money, not having employees on a vesting schedule, advisors who think they have equity but arenât on the cap table, or confusing agreements like warrants or verbal promises that donât show up in the document), or both.
âBad presentation materialsâ
This is another pass reason that is awkward for VCs to say, so just because you donât hear it doesnât mean it doesnât apply to you. Ask someone you trust to be straightforward with you about your pitch deck. It doesnât have to be a design marvel, but egregiously ugly decks are distracting and make VCs worry that you donât prioritize aesthetics now and wonât in your product later. The same goes for spelling, grammar, and legibility: be precise and clear. Communication matters. If you make these kinds of mistakes in your pitch deck where youâre aiming to put your best foot forward, it suggests youâll be even more negligent about the rest of your business.
âValuation issuesâ
Usually this means that the VCs think your valuation is too high. A high valuation means that the VC will get a smaller ownership piece for the same amount of funding, plus youâll have to raise your next round on an even higher valuation. Thatâs tough: youâll have to hit lots of milestones and execute flawlessly, and thatâs never guaranteed. Depending on how much higher your desired valuation is than what the VC thinks is reasonable, you may also risk appearing overconfident and out of touch with reality. Too low a valuation is also a negative signal: it suggests a lack of sophistication around fundraising, the market, and the value of what youâve built.
âUndesirable termsâ
Thereâs a long list of possible issues that could go wrong in negotiating a term sheetâââitâs outside the scope of this articleâââso you should push a VC to give you specifics. Some of the most contentious areas include classes of stock, pro rata rights, liquidation preferences, founder vesting, the board makeup, employee stock options, drag along rights, information rights, and voting rights.
âCo-investor dynamicsâ
The VC doesnât like the investors you already have, those you want in the current round, or both. Strategic investors, those associated with corporations, can be especially problematic because they have more complicated incentives beyond just making a return on their investment. They might invest to get a view into a product that they want to build themselves, or to get more information about your company to see if they want to buy it later. They often move slowly, ask for unusual terms stemming from their unique interests, and can create conflicts of interest with their competitors (like if your robotics company takes money from Panasonic, and then Samsung wonât partner with you because theyâre worried youâre too close to their competitor). Taking funding from a strategic investors can also signal that you didnât have interest from âregularâ institutional investors. But âregularâ VCs can be the problem, too: you never know which individual VCs have feuds with others, or which firms dislike working together. VC firms and individual investors can have long, dramatic histories that founders wonât be aware of. Although co-investor dynamics are largely out of your hands as a founder, you can sometimes get the inside scoop by asking other founders who the VCs youâre meeting with have backed before.
âFundraising tacticsâ
The way that founders run their fundraising process reflects a lot about them. Thereâs a fine line between invoking psychological and sales tactics that keep VCs interested and being unethical. Saying you have multiple term sheets in hand will inflame VCsâ competitive natures, but donât say it if you donât. Trying to force scarcity or create a rush to get an offer when there isnât one is usually obvious and can backfire.
âYou need to find a leadâ
Some firms do not lead investment rounds or only do in rare cases. If they tell you they want you to find a lead, that lead will not only put in the largest check in that round, but theyâll set the terms that the rest of the syndicate will follow. However, some VCs who donât have enough conviction around your company will ask you to find a lead as a pretext because they want to hang back and see if you can convince a quality firm or person to join. That removes some of the risk that theyâre struggling with.
âUnpersonalized cold pitchâ
Sending a cold pitch over email is a bad way to get investorsâ attention. I only know of one founder out of hundreds weâve backed at Accomplice that came in through a cold email (nice work, Mikael from Unsplash). You want the VC to invest in you, so you should invest the time in personalizing your email to them. Taking the extra few minutes to get a warm intro from someone the VC knows well, ideally a founder theyâve backed, is well worth it. If you must do a cold pitch over email, at least make it rise above the crowd. Cold email pitches should:
be personalized, explaining why this firm and these partners are a good fit for you and your idea; donât just copy and paste the same thing to every VC
be very brief, with just a high-level idea, who you are, and maybe a link to a slide deck for more info
have a reasonable ask for a first meeting (like âdo you have 15 minutes for a call?â not âwe would like to pitch your entire partnership this Fridayâ)
Product or tech-related
đ·âcloseup photo of brown, yellow, and black Asus motherboardâ by Fancycrave on Unsplash
đ·âcloseup photo of brown, yellow, and black Asus motherboardâ by Fancycrave on Unsplash
âNot enough techâ
This ânoâ is specific to technology investors. What defines âtechnologyâ is super broad these daysâââalmost every business has a website or an appâââbut most tech VC firms have a baseline amount that they need to see. What isnât technology? Life sciences, medical devices and biotechnologies, simple e-commerce, capital-intensive businesses, pure gaming companies (because success is too dependent on how individual titles perform), editorial content/media, consumer packaged goods, or heavily offline businesses. E.g., âwe sell this physical widget onlineâ is not enough if the widget itself doesnât involve any tech.
âNot enough productâ
Some VCs, usually pre-seed or micro VCs, will back startups that are nothing more than an idea. Others require a finished product thatâs been researched, tested, and launched.
âFeature, not a productâ
The VC may like the idea, but it doesnât feel significant enough to be a standalone business. This ânoâ is related to market size: the VC doesnât think the concept can hook a lot of people, or inspire them to pay or use it frequently. One way to counter this assumption, if you believe it isnât correct, is that the feature may be the focus today but itâs the first step in a larger product plan.
âProduct dysfunctionâ
Not having any product built is bad if youâre fundraising at a point where an investor expects to see it. But having bad product to show is also, wellâŠbad. If you have a tech demo, make sure it works. Prepare for demoing on different devices and in different settings, from coffee shops to conference rooms. If youâre claiming the product does X, make sure it really does X. Itâs better to under-promise and over-deliver than to hype up an investor on everything your product can do and have it flake out. Exaggerating your product capabilities can come off as disingenuous or naive.
âLicensing or IP issuesâ
Many founders, especially those who are highly technical or academic, seem to think that securing patents is important to VCs. Actually, VCs donât care much about patent portfolios; theyâre expensive, time-consuming, and can distract you from all the other things you need to do to build the business. Instead, intellectual property issues in fundraising usually have more to do with a startupâs questionable use of existing IP. A few examples:
The founders spun the technology out of a university but havenât negotiated rights to use it yet or got a bad deal
The founders used a development studio to build an app and now owe the studio a high percentage in royalties forever
The founders came from a previous company that has patents protecting a certain thing, and whatever the new startup is building looks dangerously similar to the previous companyâs tech; there may be an infringement lawsuit ahead
Business model or progress-related
đ·âlaptop computer on glass-top tableâ by Carlos Muza on Unsplash
đ·âlaptop computer on glass-top tableâ by Carlos Muza on Unsplash
âNot enough tractionâ
VCs have a bar for the amount of traction that theyâre comfortable with. Depending on the type of company, that could mean users, downloads, paying customers, revenue, partnerships, etc.
âDislike the business modelâ
Something about the business model is a red flag. Maybe the VC thinks youâre targeting the wrong customer, or that you donât understand which customer is the most valuable. Maybe your pricing seems off. Maybe that VC doesnât have confidence or enthusiasm about that type of business model. Some investors just donât like e-commerce; others love it and do only that. Maybe the model requires working with many different stakeholders and seems confusing and time-consuming. Ideally the VC tells you exactly what put her off about your model. If not, itâs okay to ask.
âDislike the go-to-marketâ
Usually this pass reason means that the VC thinks your go-to-market (GTM) plan is non-existent, not well thought-out (e.g., âweâll do a launch, and then users will justâŠfind usâ), or they donât think tactics mentioned will work. Iâve seen really high-tech products with ill-fitting, old-school GTMs, like trade shows and direct mailings for a big data company. Or simply saying âweâll do Facebook adsâ for a consumer product doesnât cut it because theyâre competitive and expensive; plus you should have an organic strategy for users to find you without paying for them.
âSupply chain concernsâ
Many VCs have horror stories about hardware startups: they tend to be a lot more expensive and take much more time to get to market than anyone expects. Many of these issues relate back to problems with the supply chain. If youâre pitching a hardware business, you or an expert on your team should know exactly how and where youâll manufacture every component and what itâll cost.
âNot a scalable modelâ
Venture-backed companies should be scalable, meaning that they can multiply revenue with minimal incremental cost as they grow. Studio or high-touch service models that need more people to do their work arenât scalable. Software scales; people do not. Many models start out with heavy reliance on people or slow processes, but they should move to scalability as they evolve.
âUnclear value propositionâ
In the investorâs opinion, youâre solving a problem that the world doesnât have. The solution that the company provides should be essential, not nice-to-have; itâs a painkiller, not a vitamin. Maybe the value proposition is strong, but itâs not coming across because of complicated or confusing messaging.
âWeak metrics/unit economicsâ
One or more aspects of your unit economics were concerning. Maybe you calculated something wrong (like you report your burn rate as much lower than it really is, or youâre claiming 50% month-over-month user growth but your user numbers donât support that), youâre presenting something that seems low (e.g., the ratio of your customer acquisition cost to your customer lifetime value is one or below, or your margins only 15% in a software business), or the investor is calculating something additional using the metrics you provided and doesnât like the result (like using acquisition cost and lifetime to determine that payback period is extremely lengthy). Weak metrics hurt your viability; false metrics hurt your credibility.
Iâve talked about the stated reasons VCs give for passing: those that have to do with the market, founders, individual VC or firm, fundraising process, product or technology, and business model or go-to-market. But sometimes actions (or inactions) speak louder than words. If a VC goes silent on you at any point in the fundraising process, theyâre not that interested. Itâs poor form and you deserve a reason, but overflowing inboxes, portfolio company emergencies, and unwieldy and unpredictable schedules are the norm in our jobs. VCs will lose interest. Speed kills in venture, so as a founder you should work to create and maintain momentum.
In the spirit of transparency, the two most common reasons why I pass are first, not feeling strongly about the founders, and second, a lack of personal interest in or conviction about in the space. Iâve seen how hard it is to build a successful venture-scale company. Itâs riddled with adversity. Pivots and crises are the norm. If I donât have a real connection with the founders in a space that they are mission-driven to care about immensely, itâs a pass. Success takes a rare combination of exceptional people, timing, and technology. Itâs a long, drawn-out battle, and VCs will crawl over broken glass for the founders weâve chosen to back.
Having conviction in either of these two components (or ideally both) will overcome almost any other reason for passing. VCs make exceptions for people and ideas that we think are truly exceptional.
Have you heard a pass reason that should be on this list? Or did you get one that you didnât understand? Iâm curious to hear. Iâm sarah(at)accomplice(dot)co and @SarahADowney on twitter.
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